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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this study is to determine the effect
of central government investment policy on provincial income
differences and changes in China from 1981 to 1986. Central
investment policy is consiaereo the most important influence
on income variation? since most income-generating sectors of
the econosy are still centrally controlled* The effects of
other geographic and economic factors on income change will
be controlled*
Since 1949» it has been repeatedly claimed by the Chinese
government that one of the main tasks of socialist
revolution is to narrow three major differences: the
differences between workers and peasants* between city and
countryside* and between mental and manual labor (Hua*
1975). An important means of reducing such differences is
through the development of the national economy. ever the
last thirty-five years, the country's economy has improved
greatly* Yet* regional income differences persist despite
efforts to eliminate them. Whether such differences can be
reduced and eventually eliminated under current economic
policy in China is still uncertain*
The Chinese central government has exclusive control of
the country's natural resources and* to a lar^e extent* its
labor resources. It also possesses the power to manipulate
other factors like market prices, food subsidies and tne
salary system to fulfill its cwn political purposes* hence,
the government has the capacity to reduce income differences
between rural and urban resi cents although perhaps at tne
expense of economic efficiency or speed of economic growth.
Beginning in 1979. there have been reforms in China's
economic framework. Such changes have been rapid in tne
agricultural sector. out slow in others* especially in tne
core industrial sector of the economy. Due to the fact that
the reform is designed to occur in several phases with each
phase emphasizing different economic sectors (e.g..
agriculture in the initial phase, which oegan in 1979 1 « the
speed of economic changes fcr different groups of people
will vary. Thus* income distribution patterns change both
within and across provinces. Undoubtedly such changes will
have great social and economic impact. Many previous
studies had focused on the effects of economic and political
reforms on the nation's economy, which is indeed a very
important topic. however* it is necessary to carry these
efforts one step further by studying how people's income
levels change during the reforms and what is the role of
central government in such changes.
A brief study of the 1983 national census (which covered
the whole population of China) shows that significant
aifferences exist when average provincial income levels are
compared* Some logical questions are: Ho* aoes central
government policy toward regional economic development
contribute to changes in incose levels in various provinces?
Is there a narrowing or widening of income differences
between city residents and rural residents as a result of
higher levels of government investment? Are there any
factors other than central government policy that may affect
income changes?
uiven the fact that income data on a regional level has
only recently become available? this thesis shoula provide
useful information on how central government investment
policy is relateo to actual income changes for various
groups of people in eacn province* The results may suggest
ways in which the government could modify its investment
policy to reduce income differences*
The distribution of resources Dy the central government
within and among the provinces plays a key role in affecting
differences in per capita income for aifferent categories of
people. This thesis will examine the impact of central
government investment on changes in income differences among
ano within China's provinces* It should contribute to a
better understanding of such governmental roles in China and
will thereby fill a gap in research on income aifferences in
China*
Chapter 2. contains a discussion or tne tneoreticai
background tor central policy making? a discussion of
ettects of Five-Year-Flans on income, ana an overview of
previous research on income differences in oath capitalist
and socialist countries. The data and method of the
research are discussed in Chapter 3» The findings are
presented in Chapter 4* Chapter 5 contains aajor
conclusions and a discussion of the significance of the
findings*
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
One topic of traditional sociological concern is tne
pattern of and changes in income distribution which respond
to different variables in capitalist and socialist
countries. Many studies have been conducted on income
inequality in capitalist countries* but few in socialist
countries* The first part of this chapter focuses on
discussions of historical changes in central government
investment policy* beginning with a brief review of the
Marxist model of socialist societies followed by a
discussion of the five-Yaar Plans before 19bG» with emphasis
on changes in inland vs. coastal and rural vs. urban
investment patterns* The second part of this chapter
begins witn a review of studies conducted in capitalist
countries* That is followed by a review of relevant studies
of economic and social changes in China*
lti£ DdXJLLSi &gde.i q± $Q£lsll±Zl Societies
Marx predicted the inevitable Breakdown of capitalism
through revolution led by the worKing class* iuch common
characteristics as class exploitation* class conflict*
production for profit instead of need* the human waste
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resulting from mass unemployment as well as massive waste of
natural resources in unplanned production would be adjusted
or eliminated in a socialist society* In such a society*
(1) public ownership of the means of production and
distribution would be instituted to assure disappearance of
exploitation and of boundaries between economic classes! (2)
government would take on an administrative role of planning
tor production around the goal of common consumption rather
than tne repressive role of safeguarding the power and
privileges of tne ruling class? and (3) with the
disappearance of private property* inequality of all Kinds
would gradually be brought to a minimum level (Abercrombie*
Hill and Turner* l^d<i). Although rtarx uid not draw an
explicit picture on how such a society should operate* he
aia predict the superiority of the socialist system over the
capitalist system in the sense that the former could make
more meaningful and efficient use of its natural and human
resources* and the social products would be equally
distributed among its members*
However* socialist nations throughout the world have
embarked on a tortuous road* Leaders of different socialist
countries with varying backgrounds have conceptualized
Harx"s model differently. Actual practices diverge even
•sore widely* One common characteristic of these socialist
countries is a largely planned and centralized economy*
ioae economists have studied central-government investment
policies in socialist countries* In a study of Poland*
il
fcalkowiak llVdi) indicated that trie economic growth rate
changed according to changes in amount of government
investment. The distribution of such investment to
different areas reveals the governments economic emphasis*
Ihis is probably also the the case in China.
Since the early 1970s-. several socialist countries in
bastern turope have initiated economic reforms anient to a
very limited extent* were followed by reforms in political
structure* In Hungary and Yugoslavia* market mechanisms
were incorporated into their planned economies in order to
improve productivity and efficiency* While the market is
still far from a free market* it provides an economic
alternative* making the centrally planned economy less
compulsory and rigid (Bauer* 1983). Such limited
experiments have generated many changes* Hungarian
agriculture particularly benefited from it* Although still
collectively owned* individually operated Hungarian farms
can make their own decisions and profit from good
performance* The resultant increased agricultural
productivity has reduced uroan-rural differences in
standards of living (Chirot, 19B7). uther socialist
countries like Poland and the Soviet Union are more cautious
in their experimentation* Centralized economic planning is
still dominant in these countries*
Tne purpose of this thesis is neitner to define types of
socialist systems* nor to determine if China fits the Maxist
model of socialism described above* tlwen that public
ownership has been dominant in China and the country's
economy has been under central pxannin^ for nearly forty
yearst 1 intend to examine no* government investment policyt
which is the major instrument of central planning.! is
affecting provincial income changes for urban ana rural
residents. To do so t it is necessary to study hoiM central
planning and central government investment have affected
local economies which may consequently determine local
income levels in China.
The change in and controversies surrounding Chinese
government policies in different historical periods since
1949 have focused mainly on two issues: 1) the balance
between agricultural and industrial development* and 2) the
balance between inland and coastal areas development* These
two issues are closely related and sometimes conflict with
each other. The relative emphasis on the two issues since
the coming to power of the Communists can be best viewed
through the Five-Year Plans.
When China established a socialist republic* there was no
existing socialist model from which to make adaptations*
except that of the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong had intended to
establish a creative model fit for China f s situation of
widespread poverty* a small scientific and technological
case* and underdeveloped industrial and urban centers.
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Nevertheless! dependence on Soviet financial and
technological input quickly helped China fall into the
fiureaucratized Soviet model* This set the tune for the
coning five-year development plans as shown in Taole i.
The governmental imbalance in its investment between the
inoustrial and agricultural sectors varied from one economic
development period to another after 1S49. however*
investment in agriculture never reached half the level of
heavy industry and* during two five-year plans* was as
little as one fifth. After three years of readjustment of
economic structure* wnich included land reforms in large
agricultural areas and co-management of industrial
enterprises previously owned by private capitalists* the
Chinese started tneir first Five Year Plan (1953-57). The
plan was oased on the Soviet model in the belief tnat
socialism should embody a high level of industrialization
and large scale agricultural production. During this
period* central government policies dominated changes in
regional economic development. The industrial sector
attracted most of central investment* whicn amounted to six
times as much as that going to the agricultural sector.
Marc dlecher (1985:5**) characterized the policies of this
period in the following way: a) highly centralized planning*
b) the "economy was administered by vertically organized
government ministries* with almost no role for horizontal
coordination oy local or regional political authorities"; c)
investment priority was given to heavy industry while
14
agriculture was left to fend for itself. These policies
tended to intensify the imbalance between the agricultural
and uroan sectors.
However* the policy of the same period also sought to
correct the unequal distribution of industrial centers among
coastal and inland areas (Roll and Yen* 19751* As a result*
two thirds of the major new industrial projects were located
in inland areas* New industrial centers in the interior
could be sore easily protected froa the danger of foreign
invasion* ouch threat mainly came from Taiwan and the
united States along the coastal areas in the 1950s and early
1960s* and from the Soviet Union from the north in the late
1960s and early 1970s* As a result* many new industrial
projects were moveo to inland areas despite the
inconvenience* From 1952 to 1955* metal-processing
industries in the inland areas increases 150J* while the
same industries in coastal areas only experienced a 89)
increase* Meanwhile* rapid increases in agricultural
production* mainly due to the strong work incentives evoked
b 1^ land-reforms and more favoraole prices paid by the
government for products produced by the peasants* also
cushioned the effects of overemphasis on industrialization*
Curing the period of 1952-5U* average income for workers
increased V7X* and for peasants <t3S (National Statistics
bureau* I960). Tne net increase in peasants* income due
15
Table 1
Investment For basic Construction in Agriculturet Light
Industry ana Heavy Inaustryv Cninat 1953-196G
absolute investment (in
100 Billion Yuan)*
* of total investment
agri- light heavy agri- light heavy
periods culture ind« irid. culture ind. ind.
fyp-i 42 37 213 / 6 36
(1953-57
J
FYP-II 136 77 652 11 o 54
(1956-62)
1963-65 74 16 194 Id •t 46
FYP-III 104 43 499 11 H 51
(1966-70)
FYP-IV 173 103 87 5 10 ft 50
(1971-75)
FYP-V 24o 156 107 5 11 7 46
(1976-80)
1900** 52 51 22 5 4C
Source: PRC: National Statistics bureau. 1967=477
FYP: Five Year Plan
*: Figures sncwn in this table are sums of tne
entire period
*"*: Figures for I960 are parts of FYP-v
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to price changes from 1953-57 was 605 million yudn» using a
1952 yuan base ( tnen* 1967)* Even though the data are not
per capita figures* they still reflect the government's
efforts to tuna agricultural programs oy increasing
purchasing prices for agricultural products.
In some respects? the second Five Year Plan was a
continuation of FYP-I. As shewn in Table it the industrial
sector still attracted most of the central investment. FYP-
II put more emphasis than did FY^-i on medium and small-
scale factories and called upon a massive movement* the
treat Leap Forward* to accelerate the speed of
industrialization. During the process* provincial
governments took over some of the medium-sized anc most of
the small factories* aiming at the improvement of
efficiency. riut the movement quicKly went out of control:
irrational ana wasteful exploitation of local resources* low
efficiency* uncoordinated all-out industrialization efforts
in virtually every fiela* and over-investment during the
Great Leap Forward period (1956-601 led the movement to a
disastrous failure. The movement also had consideraole
negative effects on agricultural production* which left the
government unprepared when serious drought* flooas ana a
plague of locusts hit the country in three successive years
starting in 1960 < Liu 1966; dlecher 1905). As Chirot
noted:
The peasants suffered and starvea* ana a large*
relatively inefficient heavy industrial sector was built
by taking produce from the peasants to feed the cities
1/
and factories. In returm the peasants were forced into
collective arrangements that simply made it easier for
the government and Party tc control them* from 1957
to the 1960s* rural per capita food consumption fell by
24 percent* but urban food consumption fell by only
2 percent* so that by I960 the cities were much better
fed than the countryside*
(1987:276)
The following five-year plans did not substantially
change the investment ratio between industry and
agriculture. The only exception was the period 19o3-6f» when
the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew its engineers* machines
and investment due to the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet
relationship* Also* three consecutive years of natural
disasters struck China* Investment shifted significantly in
favor of the agricultural sector during this period out
still remained far behind investment in the industrial
sector-
Compared with the investment ratio between industry and
agriculture* the snift in government emphasis on development
in coastal or inland areas is more frequent and noticeable*
Coastal areas were given more attention and government
investment during the second fYP* Such a shift was enhanced
by the Soviet withdraw of its aid* since new industrial
projects started with Soviet capital and technology relied*
more than ever* on technological input from coastal
industrial centers* However, the tension along the Sino-
Soviet ooroer in the late 1960s disrupted this trend: new
inaustrial projects were moved to the interior as a
preparation for war (Roll and Yeh* 1975J. Fhe industry-
is
agriculture investment ratio and the relative emphasis given
to inland vs« coastal development have been two major
concerns of Chinese policy makers since the founding of the
PRC-
After Mao's death in 1976* more pragmatic leaders seized
power. Reevaiuation of the previous economic policies led
to a period of extensive reforms which involved fundamental
ideological changes* Some Chinese scholars proposed new
assumptions: 1) Within the stage of socialist sacietyt
there can he sub-stages* the length of which vary in
different countries* China's socialist society grew out of
seai-feudal and semi-colonial patterns* Its productivity
level is still very low* thus* a preparatory stage is needed
to greatly increase productivity* it can also he a time for
the government to aquire planning and management skills and
experience* 21 Within these sub-stages* especially in a
young socialist society? diversified development models
should be explored* This may include both private and
public ownership* a market economy and central planning*
self-reliance and international cooperation* as well as
decentralization of administrative power* 31 Communist
society should not be seen as the ultimate stage of social
development. Society is defined in terms of c continuous
process* It communist society could ever be achieved* the
form of society which would follow is not defined* It is
acknowledged that society will go on developing to meet the
needs of humankind* These assumptions proviae a theoretical
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basis for present flexible state policies*
Rapid economic development is emphasized ana practical
measures to facilitate such development have been adopted*
These include decentralization of decision-making powers to
the provincial or even lower levels so that local resources
can be better used* introduction of the responsibility
system to the countryside to give people incentives to work
haraer* and an open-door policy to encourage international
cooperation* Due to the open-door policy and a new emphasis
on the economic growth rate? it is proposed that coastal
areas be emphasized again* Since 1979 there have been many
economic and social changes*
because of increasing work incentives? stimulated by the
newly installed responsibility system* agricultural
productivity shot up dramatically* Newly accumulated
capital and farm labor were directed by both central and
provincial governments to agricultural production and small-
scale agriculturally related industrial production* Another
round of localized industrialization occurred* However*
state ownership of the means of production was still che
doainant form and continued to play a major role in the
country's economy througn the year 19«6* tne end point of
this study* Central government investment policy is still
the major factor to study when examining provincial income
levels*
Societies
In studying income differences in china, it is inportant
to examine the works of western social scientists regarding
inequalities in their own countries to determine if their
concepts are relevant to a socialist society* There have
been many efforts to determine sources of income differences
in kestern societies. In an effort to locate structural
sources of income inequality in the United States*
Kalleber«»* Wallace and Althauser (19011 used measures of
capital concentration! capital intensity* state sponsored
production* size of establishment and economic scale, as
well as workers* power to account for unequal distribution
of resources* They also incorporated into their study the
educational levels of workers when analyzing various
organizational and industrial situations* It was assumed
that level of education of individual workers would also
affect their income levels* Others* like Tolbert, Horan,
ano beck (19UUI, and Stolzenberg (197a), studied income
inequality in terms of organizat ional stratification*
Many researchers relate people's positions in the
economic structure to income inequality: whether tney own
their businesses or have to sell their labor is one way of
examining income inequality (Coverman 1983* Jacoo 1983)*
£ut owner vs. worker status is not very relevant for income
inequality studies in China. Most of the Chinese business
enterprises, either under central or provincial governments*
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or under lower levels of aami nistration* are state owned or
collectively owned (especially true before 1980). People # s
incomes varied in a very limited rancje according to
educational Background* work experience and years of
service* Before 1980* nearly everyone was an •employee' of
the system rather than of any individual or firm aole to
take advantage of the ownership system*
Capitalist societies usually have considerably less
direct government involvement in economic life than do
socialist countries* Although multinational corporations
and organizations of enomous size dominate national
economies in some countries* their influence on economic
policies are only indirect* It is difficult for them to
directly auide national economic development*
Capitalist countries have a much higher social mobility
rate than does China* People enjoy comparatively more
freedom to choose occupations which best fit their knowledge
and talent acquired through education and work experiences*
Furthermore* there are basically no limits on domestic
migration* hence* direct government control over regional
income differences is very limited* even though such
differences do exist in capitalist societies* une may
conclude that in capitalist societies* characteristics of
individuals such as education* migratory behavior* and
occupation play a greater role in income distribution* while
in socialist countries* government policy and other wacro-
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level variables will be more important determinants of
income differences.
Although stuaies of western countries help to identify
some possible contributors to income differences? the social
contexts in which they were conducted still greatly limit
their generalizaoility to socialist countries* These
western analyses are deeply rooted in the context of a firai-
centered capitalist econony« where industrial and
agricultural production as well as commodity distribution
occur through a set of impersonally defined and competitive
social institutions which in turn organize a variety of
specialized occupationst again? on a competitive basis*
buch corporate system analysis can only be used analogically
in China because of china's high level of centralization and
state ownership* Factors such as capital intensity* size
of establishment and economic scale do have certain effects
on income variation* but the functions of these factors and
the ways in which they relate to production and* eventually?
to income differences between provinces are highly
manipulated by the central government through controls on
capital supply? the raw-materials rationing system*
commodity markets and prices? and the salary system*
Cospetition plays a much smaller role and in no way
dominates comraooity and labor markets in China* Thes
contextual conditions suggest that the central government
still retains its decisive power to influence income
aistr iout ion? especially at a macro or provincial level in
zJ
e
China* and such power is often reflected through policies
which are embedded in its political* ideological* and
economic systems*
There nave been many studies of social change and
development in China* out few which emphasize the impact of
development on income differences* Besides the traditional
focus on natural geographical resources in studying the
local economy (fei 1946* Petrov and Liu 1383}* some
scholars based their studies on other aspects* like
political considerations in economic development (tmery
1966* Koll* Jr. and Yen 1975)* and the urbanization process
(Leung ana binsburg 19bG» white and Parish 1984 l« But very
little effort has centered on determining the effects of
central policy on cross-province or i ntra-province income
differences.
An exception is the work of Hall and Yeh (1975) which
discusses China's regional economic development policies in
coastal and inland areas in the 1950s* Policies of this
period greatly favored the inland areas for three reasons:
1) the coastal areas with highly concentrated industries
were vulnerable to foreign invasion; 2) eliminating
regional inequalities was considered very important
ideologically* and 31 a more balanced distribution of
industrial centers would reduce the pressure on
transportation (then very backward). This kind of policy*
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of courset sacrificed, to some extent, the speed and
efficiency of economic development* Roll and Yen also
discussed the fluctuation of government policies during the
1960s and early 1970s* They used population and its change
as indicators of policy changes in these areas, but this
method may not oe very effective or accurate since
population movement was tightly controlled in China through
a complex registration system* In my study, I Mill Jscrrow
their concepts of inland and coastal areas simply to reflect
different levels of historical and geographical economic
aevelopment efforts*
Stack (1973} pointed out that "the decree of direct
government involvement in the economy is tne single most
important factor associated with low income inequality"
(197d: 360)* In other words, high government involvement in
the economy can significantly lower income inequality* And
"this relationship is independent of both the level of
economic development and the rate of economic growth"
(Stack, 197a: ddO). It is proposes that central government
investment in the local economy is the single most important
factor influencing regional income variations in China*
Halpern (19tib) studied the resources behind China's present
policies* rthile searching for ways to improve economic
performance, Chinese leaders after ftao advocated stuoies of
foreign experiences, especially those of the Eastern
European countries, as sources of information for developing
pol icies*
25
Perhaps the aost relevant dimension for assessing income
differences in China is the two types of citizenship* They
have the effect of placiny people in different positions in
the economic structure* One type of citizensnip is for
people who live in cities and towns and work for wages* the
other is for peasants who live in the countryside ano earn
their living mainly by producing agricultural products.
Peasants cannot live and work in cities except on rare
occasions like being enrolled as college students or being
employed by a new factory* These changes* however? are
possible only after obtaining permission at various
administrative levels* It is difficult for peasants to
become city residents* who generally have a higher standard
of living* Since opportunities for changing to urban
citizenship are rare* competition for the few positions is
keen* City residents enjoy a guaranteed salary* government
subsiaized food* and other social benefits like free
medication* better educational conditions* retirement
pensions* etc* Their average income* at least until
recently* has oeen consideraoly higher than that of
peasants* Thus* tne worker-peasant dimension represents
substantial income differences. In my study* tne combined
and separate effects of central policy on average income
will be examined for both city residents and residents in
the countryside*
Conclusion's
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Several conclusions emerge from this chapter: 1) those
studies done in western capitalist contexts do not supply
readily applicaoie models for similar studies in China*
though they are suggestive in locating possible contributors
to income changes* 2) An overall synthetic study of
regional income differences in China which includes central
government investment policy as a causal variable has not
been conducted* 3) Recent changes in policies have not been
fully incorporated into studies of regional income
distribution- A brief historical review of central policies
was conducted in order to better understand the impact of
such policy changes on income variation* 4> Coastal-inland
and industry-agriculture differences in government
investment are important fcr evaluating the effects of
government investment on income changes*
27
CHAPTER 3
DATA AHD MfcTHOC
As indicated in Chapter 2« many previous studies have
focused on factors affecting income inequality* Such
studies cannot he readily replicated in China since detailed
income data had not until recently been published in China,
line reason tor a lack of published data on income inequality
until recently is that the government considered income
differences a sensitive issue* The government has
established various mechanisms to limit occupational
mobility not only within the urban sector but also between
the urban and rural sectors* Population migration is also
under tight control. These migration policies may* in some
instances* have worked against and* in others* favored the
perpetuation of income inequalities.
Instead of using characteristics of individuals* such as
education or occupation* as determinants of income
inequality in China* this research is designed to find out
what particular effects central government investment policy
has on provincial income changes* Considering the
consistent imbalance in government investment between
agriculture and industry, it is expected that investment
will have different effects on income changes for urban and
rural residents. Therefore* income changes for the total
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urban and rural provincial population* as well as income gap
changes between urban and rural population* are all tested.
The effects of other macro-level factors also expected to
contribute to provincial incogs changes were controlled for
in the analysis in order to achieve more accurate estimates*
dased on discussions in previous chapters* 1 expect that per
capita government investment hill have a positive ispact on
changes in per capita income for total provincial
population* for urban residents* ana for rural residents*
Ihe relation of government investment to income gap change
is expected to oe positive* That is* high government
investment will contribute to a closing of the gap between
rural ana urban incomes*
The 29 provinces of China are the units of analysis* It
would be preferable to use the county as the unit of
analysis tor this study* but data are not available at that
level* Provincial borders are usually rivers and mountain
ranges so that provinces have unique characteristics of
climate* natural resources and type of economy* beginning
in 1950* each province was encouraged to develop an
independent local economy* yet they are still heavily
dependent on central input*
Data for two points in time (1931 and 19861 are used in
the belief that it takes so*e time tor provincial income
levels to change as a result of government investment* The
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data used are taken from China*s Statistics Yearbook
published by the Chinese National Statistics bureau
<19ti2*19B7)* Very little is known about the specific
sources ot data ana methods used for collecting the Qdtd.
There are very limited explanations in the book as to how
certain variables are defined and calculated- But the data
are considered reliable for the following reasons: II In
conjunction with the economic reform initiated in 1979*
governments at all levels were urged to base tneir plans and
reports on factual information* which also helps local
officials to make sensible decisions* 21 Since the National
Statistical Bureau sets the standards for my data collected
by its counterparts at the provincial level. the data from
oifferent provinces are believed to be collected in a
similar manner* with the sane standards* which makes the
data more useful for comparative purposes. 3) fcven when
some data are collectea through surveys* they are usually
the results of very large sample surveys which are
generously sponsored by the government* Such data are
assumed to be representative and adequate* li££SfldHQi
Variables
Percent change in per capita income between ISul and 1966
was calculated as follows:
percent change in income - (income*a6-
income* 31 1x100/ income'Bl
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TASLc 2
independent* Control and Dependent Variables
independent dnd control Dependent variables
variables
Per capita national government income change
investment* 1981 for urban residents
Provincial location Income change
(inland vs coastal) for rural residents
Percentage of total output which income change for
is from agriculture* 1981 total provincial
population
Change in rural-urban
income gap ratio
Note: Dependent variaoles refer to percentage changes
in per capita income and change in income gap ratio
between 1981 and 1986.
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Income change variables (all income measures are at a per
capita level) calculated by this formula were calculated for
the provincial population as a whole* for urban residents
ano tor rural residents of the province* These are three of
the four dependent variables. The last dependent variable
is percent change in per capita rural-urban income ^op
ratio. it was calculated for the period 1981-1986* usins
the rationing formula (all income measures are per capita
measures)
:
percent change in rural-urban income jap ratio = (rural
income* 86/urban incose'86 - rural incone'81/uroan
income* 81)/ (rural income* 81/uroan income'dl)
A positive income gap ratio indicates that the difference
between rural and uroan incomes decreased from 1981 to 1986.
Ihe average annual income for both city and rural residents
is measured in yuan* The term "city resiaent*1 refers not
only to workers* engineers and technicians in factories and
other production organizations but also to teachers and
professors in schools and colleges* doctors and nurses in
hospitals and administrative officials at all levels* They
all work in the state-owned or collectively-owned
institutions and receive monthly salaries and benefits paid
by the state* They are all considered to be co-owners of
the state-operated means of production* Their dependents
are also included in this category*
The terra "rural residents" refers to all the people
living in rural aredS who work for profit* wnich is defined
as the money they jet from selling their surplus produce
after submitting the required amount to the government as
duties or quotas* Some of them may work as teachers in
schools or as workers in smallt collectively-owned factories
or other collectively owned enterprises in the countryside
(including people's communes in iSdli by 1906* the communes
had been dismantled)* tsut as long as they do not work for
salaries from the government ano do not receive benefits
provided by the government* they are counted as rural
citizens*
1* Per capita government investment* 1981 (independent
variable)
The amount of per capita central government investment in
each province in 1931 was used as an indicator of central
government involvement* dy 1961* national government
investment was still the major source of input for local
economic developments in China*
2* Geographic location (inland vs coastal) (control
var iable)
Ihe location of provinces has an impact on
inf rastructurai development for both agricultural and
industrial production* Those provinces located along the
lower course of the Yangtze Kiver and those along the coast
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hawe bean geographically sore accessible than other
provinces* A comparatively wore developed transportation
and market system is believed to have positive effects on
local economic development* Thus* each province was coded
according to its location* This variable is dicnotomous*
Coastal location was coded as one and inland as zero.
3* Percentage of total output which is from agriculture*
1961
(control variaolel
This variable is agricultural output as a percentage of
overall provincial output in 19dl* It is an estimate of the
height ot agricultural production in tne provincial economy*
It is a gross indicator of the relative weight of agrarian
vs. urban-type economic activity in the province*
Ordinary least-squares regression was used to estimate
the effects of tne independent variables on the income
change variables* Since I have four dependent variables*
the results of four separate analyses are reported* The
hypothesized effects of independent and control variaoles
are presented in the following equation:
Y = a biXi + b*Xa - 133 X3 + e
Where Y = income change variaole in each regression?
a = constant*
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D = coefficients to £>e estimated,
Xi = per capita yovernaient investment in i^81t
aj = provincial location (inland vs. coastal!*
X3 = percent of total provincial output which is
from agriculture in 19dl» and
e = residual term*
Multicollinearity and the effects of outliers were
assessed* using appropriate statistical tests*
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CHAPTtR •»
FINDINGS
The first part of this chapter is devoted to the
discussion of oivariate correlations among all variables*
in order to reveal how income levels of urban and rural
residents change under the influence of government
investment and provincial location* some simple calculations
based on mean variable values are presented* The last part
of tne chapter contains the results of the regression
analysis*
The bivariate zero-order correlations among all
independent and dependent variables are reported in Table J*
A high correlation between two independent variables
suggests that multicollineari ty is a proolem* however* the
results do not indicate unacceptably high correlations among
independent and control variables (tne correlation between
per capita government investment and percentage of total
output from agriculture* -.62* was tne highest of the three
correlations)*
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This test may not have detected all possible
multicollineari ty problems sines one independent variable
may be highly correlated witn other independent variables in
the equation* but not highly correlated with any single one
ot them (cserry and Feldman* 1S85I*
berry and Feldman suggest that "the most reasonable test
for oiulticollinearity is to regress each independent
variable in the equation on all other independent variables*
and Iook at R-squares for these regressions* if any are
close to 1.00* there is a nigh degree of mult icollinear ity
present." bhen I examined the regression results* 1 found
that K-squares for all three regression equations are within
acceptable limits with the highest being .49* suggesting
that multicollineari ty is not a problem*
The oivariate table also shows how the independent and
control variaoles are correlated with each of the four
dependent variables* As expected* governmental investment
(PLbiNVUU has a fairly strong positive relationship with
per capita income changes for urban* rural and total
population (r=*60* r=*S9, r=.42» respectively). its
relation tilth income change for the entire population is
smaller than its relation with income changes for rural and
urban populations singly* This may be due to the effects of
other variables on income change for provincial population*
en the other hand* per capita government investment has a
negative relationship with income gap changes* which was not
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expected. The coefficient is -.16. high capital investment
appears to widen the gap between urban and rural incomes*
(See also Table 5 for actual mean levels and percentage
changes.)
The relationships between the inland-coastal variable
(1NLALUA5) and all dependent variables are in the predicted
direction. Although its relationship with per capita income
change for the urban population is relatively weak ir-.Jj),
it has a stranger relation with per capita income change for
all other income change variables. The difference between
its correlations with per capita income change tor rural
ir=.<t6) and urban residents (r=.Ub) may account for its
higher correlation than other independent and control
variables with income gap changes tINCt.APCH; r=.3l). Ina
iSf coastal provinces experienced a greater narrowing of
urfcan-rural income differences than did inland provinces
isee Table h for actual mean figures) for the 1961-1986
period. That is because rural incomes in coastal provinces
grew at a substantially greater rate tnan did urban incoxes
in those provinces (10*.* vs. 34%).
The correlations between the agriculture output
proportion variable and income change far total population,
urban ana rural residents are strong ana in the expected
direction* ranging from -.26 to -.40.
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TAuLE 3
2ero-Urder Correlations Auiony All
Variablest with Means and Standard Deviations*
29 Provinces of China
1. INLACGAii 1.00 .39 -.53 .36 .06 .46 .31
2. PCG1NV81 1.00 -.62 .4/: .60 .59 -.16
3. tCGTYP81 1.C0 -.25 -.26 -.40 .0C3
4. PCiNwPCH 1.00 .55 .90 .09
b. UKPCINCH 1.00 .39 -.73
6. AbPCINCH 1.00 .30
7. 1NCGAPCH i.CU
MEAN 0.35 64.7 35.9 73.7 34.1 65.2 0.43
S.G 0.46 68. o 15.2 17.2 26.4 25.7 0.34
1. INLAcuAo - Cummy variable of inland vs. coastal areas.
(inland=Gi coastal=l)
2. PC61NV81 = Per capita government investment.
3. fcCuTYP&l = percentage of total provincial output from
agriculture
4. PCINWPCH = Percent change in per capita income for
total population* between 19B1 and 1966.
b» URPCINCH = Percent change in urban per capita income*
between 1981 and 1966.
6. AGPCINCH = percent change in rural per capita income
between 1961 and 1986.
7. INCbAPCH - Change in incone gap ratio between 1961 ana
1966. A positive number indicates that the
rural income mean is closer to the urban
mean in 198b than in 1981.
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The coefficient with rural population income change is
strongest tr=-.4U). which means that the nigher the
proportion of agricultural output in total provincial
outputt tne slower the rate of income increase for the rural
population* The relation between the incoae gap change
ratio and proportion of output which is tron agriculture is
negligible*
The following two taoles should help to clarify some of
the discussions aoove. Hean incomes for both urban and
rural residents based on their provincial location status
and the level of per capita government investment in each
province are calculated and presented in Tables H and 5*
Table H shows that the mean rural income in the coastal
areas had a one third greater increase than that in inland
areas Ciu2£ vs. lb%\ • while urban incoae increases in both
coastal and inlana areas occurred at nearly the same rate.
At both time periods, inland per capita incomes exceeded
coastal per capita incomes for those with urban citizenship.
It is clear that state wage policy has favored inland areas.
The state did not directly control rural Incomes in either
period. Rural incomes were hi^ner in coastal than in inland
provinces. It appears that provincial location has a
greater impact on rural income changes than on urban income
changes. This is supported oy the regression analysis
presented below.
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As shown in Taole 5? those provinces receiving sore than
50 yuan (hi^h) government investment per capita have
increasea their income much faster for both their urban and
rural residents than provinces getting less than 50 Yuan
(IomI j year* This suggests that government investment
plays an important role in people's income changes* out
high government investment did not lead to as fast a closure
in the income gap ratio 12.UX) as was achieveo by provinces
with less government investment (41*)* Government
investment policy does not appear to contribute to a closing
of the rural-urban incone ^ap* perhaps because most central
government investment goes to industry and not agriculture*
however? these comparisons as well as the oivariate
analyses do not provide the basis for formally testing the
hypotheses* Reyression analysis provides the basis for
assessing the effects of each independent variable on the
dependent variable when the effects of other variables are
controlled*
b£.*XejiS.i.flfl &££Ulls.
Results from all four regressions are reported in Table
6* Only those unstandardi^ed coefficients which are twice
their standard error are statistically significant* Among
the independent variables in the first column* none of tne
coefficients are statistically significant* and only
government investment and
11
Table 4
Relation between Provincial Location
and Income Chanyest 29 provinces of China
LCCA- Coastal (n=10) Inland (n=I9)
HON
mean income t> change mean income * change
1961 1986 (1961-86) 1981 1986 (1981-86)
(Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan)
UR8AN 610 827 34* 645 873 3i>*
RURAL 29_> 593 10^* 210 368 75*
OIFFtR- 317 ^34 -26* 435 505 16*
fcNCc
RURAL
INCOME
AS * OF 46* 72* 50*« 33* 42* 27**
URBAN
INCOME
* Indicates reduction in urban-rural income gap between
1981 and 1986 cased on difference between the percentage
that rural income was of uroan income in 1981 and 1986»
divided by the 1981 percentaget and multiplied by 100.
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Table 5
Relation of Level of Government Investment
to Per Capita Income Change
High Lom
IfcVfcSI- (>50/per capita n=9) (<50/per capita n=20)
*ent
mean income 4 change mean income 4 change
1981 1986 (1981-86) 1981 1986 11981-86)
Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan) (Yuan)
URBAN 700 1100 574 o03 748 244
RURAL 28G 566 1024 220 392 784
CIFFfcR- 420 534 274 383 356 -74
fcNCt
RURAL
lNCOMfc
AS 4 OF 404 514 284 374 524 414
URBAN
INCOME
* (Same footnote as Table 4)«
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inland-coastal location were related to changes in income of
the total population in the predicted direction. Hcwevert a
conparison of their standardized coefficients shows that
government investment is the most important determinant of
income changes for the entire provincial population. Note
that the inland-coastal variable is almost equally
importantt which indicates that provincial locations also
make considerable contributions to the overall per capita
income changes. Yett the finding that the agricultural
output proportion is positively but weakly related to such
income changes was unexpected.
tahen the variable of urban per capita income change
CuKPClNLHI is regressed on the independent variables*
government investment in 19til is the only one with a
significant Influence (b-0»28J and it is in the predicted
direction. fne two control variables dc not have
significant effects (INLAtuAo, b=-7.6<»; ECUTYP81t b=u.21).
And neither one is in the predicted direction. Note that
the standardized coefficient for the government investment
variable (fieta=0«73l is much stronger than that for the
other two variables UNLACGAS* beta=-.l*; tLLTYPfil*
Beta=.12lt which indicates that government investment is the
cost important predictor of urban per capita income change.
The fact that tne inland-ccasta! variaole is negatively
related to uroan income changes may indicate that uraan
residents in the coastal areas did not experience as great
an increase in income as die their counterpart in inland
<t4
areast once government investment is controlled for (the
zero-order relationship is weakly positive).
The regression with per capita income change for rural
residentst which is presented in the third column, shows a
similar pattern to the first regression. Per capita
government investment in 19fll ( PCGINVtil f 5=0.20 1 is still the
cnly significant variable and it is in the predicted
direction* The relationship of the inland-coastal variaole
(INLALUAS) to rural income changes is positive as predicted.
The direction of relationship between agriculture output
proportion (ECUTYPbl) and rural income change is opposite to
the prediction. The relation is insignificant and weaK.
The regression in the fourth column with income gap
change as the dependent variable (INCbAPCH) shows that the
only significant independent variable is provincial location
(b=0.32)t that is. the income gap narrowed more in coastal
areas than it did in inland areas. controlling for per
capita level of government investment. The government
investment contribution is neither significant—though it
approaches significance—nor is the relationship in the
predicted direction. uovernment investment (controlling on
inland-coastal location and on agriculture's share of total
output) did not contribute to the narrowing of the urban-
rural income gap. Tjbie 5 suggests that high government
investment contrioutes less to narrowing the urban-rural
income gap than do lower government investment levels.
TAiiLE 6
ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of the effects of
Government Policy* Geographic LocaCion, and Ayricultural
output on Provincial Level Income Changes* (1981-C6).
Change in Change in Change in Change in
Income income Income Income
Total Pop Urban Rural Gap
PCGINV81 (S) Qm*tO 0.73 G.S3 -0.34
(Ul 0.10 0.26 « 0.20 * -O-loO
S.E. (0.06) (0.08) (0.0/) 10.0831
INLACUAS (S) 0.31 -0.14 0.30 0.46
(U) 11.16 -7.64 16.03 0.32 4
S.E. (7.35) (10.10) (9.63) (0.13)
ECGTYP81 (S) 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.04
(U) 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.C01
S.E. (0.27) (0.33) (0.36) (0.005)
R-Square 0.24 0.39 0.42 0./10
(.INSTANT 56.76 11.07 61.14 0.40
PCGINvdl = Per capita yovern&ent investment.
INLACUAS = Dummy variable of inland vs. coastal areas.
ECLTYP81 = Percentage of total output from agriculture.
PCINWPCH = Percent change in per capita income for
total population* oetween 1961 and 1966.
URPCINCH = Percent change in urban per capita income*
between 1981 and 1986.
AbPClNCH = Percent change in rural per capita income
between 1961 and 1986.
INCGAPCH = Change in income gap ratio between 1961 and 1986
Positive numbers indicate that rural income mean
is closer to urban mean in 1986 than in 1981.
Note: Standardized Coefficients (S) and unstandard izeo
coefficient (U) are shown with standard error in
parentheses (S.E.)
*: Unstandardized coefficient at least twice its
standard error.
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Ihis is not very surprising* since government investment
contributes more strongly to an increase in uraan income
than it does to an increase in rural income. That is
because* as discussed in Chapter 2* government investment is
much more oriented to heavy industry than to agriculture*
Ihe contribution of agr iculture"s proportion or output to
the urban-rural income yap change is far from being
significant. From this regression* one can concluae that
provincial location (1NLACUAS) is a major predictor of
income gap changes within each province.
Plots of standardized residuals for each regression were
checKed and two outliers were found* one (Jiangsu Province)
in the second regression and the other (Zhejiang Province)
in the last regression. Since the existence of outliers may
bias the results* regressions without the outliers were run.
Ihe results of these reanalyses were not substantially
different from the results of the full sample; therefore*
those regressions are not reported here.
The findings indicate that government investment has a
greater effect on income changes than do the other predictor
variables in the study. However* government investment has
the affect of widening the income gap between urban and
rural residents* contrary to the predicted effect.
Provincial location affects the income gap changes the most.
Ihis is due mainly to the much greater growth of rural
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incomes in coastal than in inland areas* while urban income
change is not affected by location of province.
Given the fact that government investment is hignly
correlated with the percentage of urban population in the
entire provincial population* it is assumed that government
investment in 1981 was directed mainly to more
industrialized areas where urban populations are
concentrated* The assumption is supported by the bivariate
relationship lr= -«62l between government investment and
agricultural output proportion shown in Taole 3.
Clearly government investment has a greater impact on
income changes for both rural and urban residents as well as
for the entire population than do provincial location and
agricultural output proportion* However* its impact on
urban income changes is stronger than it is on rural income
changes* which may indicate where government investment was
mainly concentrated* The fact that urban income changes are
strongly related only to government investment while rural
income changes have another contributor* provincial
location* leads one to conclude that* under the new reform
conditions* rural residents are benefiting from being in the
historically more developed coastal areas. On the other
hand* urban incomes in inland areas were slightly higher in
1981 than they were in coastal areas* And this situation
remained the same after all the structural changes between
1981 and 198b.
4B
The positive impact of provincial location on income gap
changes is much greater than tnat of government investment
which is negatively related to income gap change. _ne can
conclude that central government investment is not designed
to narrow income gaps between urban and rural residents or
at least does not have that effect. The influence of
agricultural output proportion has been consistently
insignificant in every regression, whatever variance it may
explain in income changes is largely sharea with per capita
government investment (the .zero-order correlation between
the two is -.62.)
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Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to determine what effect
central government investment had on provincial income!
changes tor people with the two kinds of citizenship
(roughly equivalent to urban and rural)* under the economic
reforms of the 1960s in China. Those reforms include the
responsibility system in the countryside and the proposed
decentralization of decision-making powers from the central
government to more local levels including the family itself.
At the same time* 1 controlled for the effects of other
posslole macro-level predictors* including proportion of
total output from agriculture and inland-coastal location*
ifl£li£^lJLfiJQ^ £l &o.v.££i)ffl.£JQl In ve.siiBe.ui
Government investment as a major source of input for
economic development in each province is still the most
inpertant factor in affecting income changes for both urban
ana rural residents as well as the entire provincial
population. riut it does not narrow the income gap between
urban and rural residents* as was hypothesized* It is
clear that the present Chinese government is not taking
measures to eliminate or even to decrease the income ^ap
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between urban and rural residents through its investment
policy* This is related to the fact that most yovernment
investment is urban oriented? thus government has much less
oirect control over rural income changes than it has over
changes in urban incomes*
Economic reforms in uroan areas* which were started much
later than those in rural areas* have not fundamentally
affected the nation-Mide salary system. If they nao*
presumaoly urban income woula have risen much faster in
coastal areas* because of the greater resources there* than
in inland areas* Urban income increases still basically
depend on nation-wide salary policy* Tne average income for
urban residents in coastal areas in 1966 is sightly lower
then it is in inland areas and its rate of increase is the
same as in inland areas* One can conclude that urban
residents in coastal areas have not been benefiting from
economic reforms due to tne control that government had over
the existing salary system for the period 1961-1986* and to
a policy* implicit or explicit* of keeping state salaries in
inland areas as hiflh or a little bit higher than they are in
coastal areas*
As in past Five-Year Plans* government investment
continues to favor urban areas (industrial sector)* and
leaves the rural areas (agricultural sector) to fend for
themselves* It is clear that the initial step of economic
reforms which started in the countryside in China does not
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mean that government policy has reversed its investment
emphasis* The industrial sector still enjoys its favourable
position in attracting central investment. On the other
hand, rural inhabitants nave been given considerable freedom
under the responsibility system to produce and earn
independent of government investment. Hence. the speed of
income increase for rural residents exceeds that of urban
residents. The income gap between urban and rural residents
narrowed in each of the 19 provinces between 1981 and 1986.
Dramatic increases in per capita income for rural
residents owes much to the responsibility systems installed
in the early 1980s throughout rural China. This system
allows the farmers to retain their surplus products after
fulfilling production quotas at prices set by the
iovernment. They can either sell their surplus to the
government at much higher prices than quota prices or sell
it on the free market? whichever way they think is more
profitable. This system has given farmers substantial work
incentives and released prcductivity potential. As a
result* agricultural production has increased dramatically .
and farmers' incomes have increased accordingly even without
a sharp increase of input from the central government. This
means that changes in administrative policy can also lead tc
income changes.
The greater increase in rural income in coastal areas
also indicates that people in rural areas can benefit from
more developed local economies* The sharply increased
productivity in farming suddenly freed large nuauers of
people in rural areas for other economic activities*
especially in densely populated coastal areas* sased on
this* the government has been encouraging farmers to engage
in food processing* lignt industrial production or various
low to moderate technology services* People in coastal
areas have taken advantage of being close to urban centers
iMhich means closeness to financial and technical resources!
to organize their own industrial production* which has
turned out to be much more profitable than agricultural
production* They were also encouraged to produce high value
crops* such as fruits and vegetables* because of a ready
urban market at free market prices* Iheir average income
level thus increased much faster than that of their
counterparts in inland areas* Prom Table <t» we can see that
average income tor rural residents in coastal areas in 19&6
is much higher (t>l%) than that of their counterpart in
inland areas*
A new economic policy which emphasizes a higher economic
growth rate has been set on its way* Among rural areas of
the provinces* government policy through implementation of
the responsibility system has contributed to exacerbating
inequalities between those areas with a broader economic and
technological base and those areas which are less well
enaowed. The results of this study also suggest that little
has changed in the central government investment policies*
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The government is continuing its unbalanced investment
ratio* which favors industry over agriculture.
Surprisingly* inlana areas continue to be favored over
coastal areab in terms of urban wage policy during the
period being studied*
iiiiiii£ij.iijjDJi L2L tmuLz Studies
For developing more accurate estimates on central
policy w s impact on income pattern changes* the Chinese
province as an unit of analysis seems too big* When data
are available* analysis at the county level is highly
recommended* Since China has more than 2GGG counties which
are more homogeneous than provinces* data at this level
should more clearly indicate how local situations are
related to income changes for different categories of
people*
it appropriate data are available in the future* more
variables can be included in future studies because the
income level is also related to many factors other than
those used in this study* For instance* if the urbanization
level of each province or county is measured by the number
and size of its cities and towns* the variable can more
accurately reflect the concept* It would also be useful to
directly test the impact of inaividual workers'
characteristics. such as level of education* on income
differences*
bt
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This thesis is designee to identify the particular
effects of central government investment policy on
geographic income variations in China, oovernment
investment policy has oeen the Key factor aetermining the
direction and rate of local economic development:. It has
hypothesized that government investment policy* measured
cy per capita central government investment* has a
positive effect on income change in the £9 provinces of
China* Income change was measured for the period
lSbl-lvdo tor the total population and for the two types
cf citizenship—the rural and the urban population. It
as also hypothesized that the income yap between rural
and urban populations would be closed more rapidly in
provinces with high per capita investment than those with
low investment* It is believed that other possible
determinants of income level such as geographic location
(inland vs. coastal)* sectoral characteristics of the
provincial economy (measured oy percent of total output
from agriculture) are important alternative contrioutors
to income changes. Their effects were controlled in the
analysis of government investment policy.
I used ordinary least-squares (ijL-j) regression to
assess the effects of per capita government investment on
changes in per capita income for provincial urban and
rural residents and the entire provincial population as
well as income gap changes between uroan and rural
populations*
Results froi the regression analysis shotted that the
government investment policy is still the aost important
factor in positively affecting income changes for both
urban and rural residents* Yet is contributes to a modest
increase in the income gap between urban and rural
residents* Since government investment is concentrated
heavily in the industrial sector* tnat is not surprising*
The strongest predictor of a declining income gap between
urban and rural income was geographic location* Rural
incomes closed the gap with uroan incomes much more
rapidly in coastal provinces than in inland provinces?
reflecting the considerable aoility of peasants in coastal
areas to take advantage of the more favorable resource
endowment and market opportunities than were available to
those in inland areas as the responsibility system was
implemented in the countryside*
